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Abstract 
Qatar is currently the highest emitter per capita and targets emission reduction by exercising 
tight controls on gas flaring. In order to limit the emission under allowances, the power plants 
have two options: investing in carbon capture and storage (CCS) systems or buying carbon 
credits for the excess emissions above their allowances. However, CCS systems are 
expensive for installation and operation. In this paper, a mixed integer linear programming 
(MILP) model is developed for the design of integrated carbon capture, transport and storage 
infrastructure in Qatar under carbon trading scheme. We first investigate the critical carbon 
credit prices to decide under which price it is more beneficial to invest on CCS systems or to 
buy carbon credits via carbon trading. Then the fair design of the CCS infrastructure is 
obtained under two fairness scenarios: the same saving ratio and the game theory Nash 
approach. Fair cost distribution among power plants in Qatar is obtained by selecting the CO2 
resources (power plants) to be captured with available capture technologies and materials, 
designing the transportation pipeline network to connect the resources with the sequestration 
and/or utilisation sites and determining the carbon trading price and amount among power 
plants. Under different fairness scenarios, the total costs are slightly higher than that from 
minimising the total cost to obtain the fair cost distribution. Power plants with higher CO2 
emissions determine to install CCS system, while other power plants buy the carbon credits 
from domestic or international market to fulfil their carbon allowance requirements. The 
future work includes extending the current model by considering power generation 
distribution and designing the pipeline network with the selection of pump locations and pipe 
diameters. 
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1 Introduction 
Increasing greenhouse gas emission (GHG) is considered as one of the main reasons for 
global warming. Reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from energy system involves 
reforestation, energy efficiency enhancement, fuel substitution, utilisation of low-carbon 
technologies and carbon capture and storage (CCS) (Chicco and Stephenson, 2012). One 
more CO2 reduction method is known as carbon capture and conversion (CCC), which 
recovers CO2 to synthesise useful products through chemical transformation (Taheri 
Najafabadi, 2015). CCS enables the continued use of fossil fuels which accounts for over 
80% of global total primary energy consumption (Anantharaman et al., 2013) and CCS is 
recognised as an attractive option for CO2 abatement on a large scale from centralised energy 
systems. Three main steps are included in CCS: CO2 capture from gaseous combustion, CO2 
transportation and CO2 storage in reservoirs. In power generation section, CO2 emissions can 
be captured by pre-combustion technique, after combustion technique or the oxyfuel process. 
CO2 transportation, which connects the capture and sequestration, can apply carbon pipeline, 
ships or road tankers. Pipe line transport is ideal for large-scale and long-distance. Captured 
CO2 can be stored in sinks with different geological formations, such as deep saline 
formations, depleted oil and gas reservoirs (with or without enhanced oil recovery) and deep 
unmineable coal seams (Middleton and Bielicki, 2009a). 
The optimal design of the CCS system has been investigated in several recent studies around 
the world. A toolbox integrating ArcGIS and MARKAL is developed to assess the 
development of a large-scale CO2 infrastructure in the Netherlands for 2010-2050 (van den 
Broek et al., 2009). Three different CCS infrastructure systems are assessed for six EU 
member states: Begium, Czech Republic, Germany, Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia in 
(Kjärstad et al., 2011). Middleton and Bielicki (2009b) introduce a comprehensive model, 
simCCS, to solve for optimal spatial deployment of the CCS infrastructure. It minimises the 
annual cost by determining the pipeline network between CO2 sources and sinks. Then a five-
step process for developing a candidate pipeline network is introduced based on the simCCS 
model (Middleton et al., 2012). Tan et al. (2012) present a continuous-time mixed integer 
linear programming (MILP) model to match CO2 sources and sinks in CCS systems while 
considering the storage limitations of the sinks. A multi-period MILP model is also proposed 
by them (Tan et al., 2013) to match CO2 sources and inks under the constraints of temporal, 
injection rate and storage capacity. Weihs et al. (2011) develop an optimisation model for 
CCS pipeline networks to minimise the network cost with a genetic algorithm. The model is 
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applied to design the CCS network for the south eastern Queensland region in Australia. An 
optimisation model, InfraCCS model, is described by Morbee et al (2012), which minimises 
the cost of a CO2 transport network at European scale for 2015-2050. Non-technological 
issues, including economies of scale, infrastructure ownership and political incentives, are 
analysed within the existing CO2 transport infrastructure in (Brunsvold et al., 2011). What is 
more, utilisation and disposal of CO2 is included in a scalable and comprehensive CCS 
infrastructure model introduced by Han and Lee (2011). Hasan et al. (2014; 2015) design a 
CO2 capture, utilisation and sequestration (CCUS) supply chain network to minimise the cost 
by selecting the source plants, capture processes, capture materials, CO2 pipelines, locations 
of utilisation sites and amounts of CO2 storage.  
The major challenge toward large-scale deployment of CCS is its high cost, while carbon 
trading approach is proposed for emission control from economic incentives. It refers to the 
trading of emissions of six major GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphurhexafluoride 
(SF6). There are several mandatory emissions trading schemes under operation, which are 
European Union Emissions Trading system (EU ETS), Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(USA), New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme, Tokyo metropolitan trading scheme and 
the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (Australia) (Perdan and Azapagic, 
2011). Among them, USA has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1998). Uddin and 
Holtedahl (2013) classify the emission trading schemes into three groups: ‘cap-and-trade’, 
‘rate-based’ and ‘project-based’. The international emissions trading under Kyoto Protocol 
allows for less costly emissions abatement than domestic actions alone. Emission reductions 
are expected to take place where the cost of reduction is the lowest. The EU ETS is the 
largest multinational emission trading scheme in the world, and the governments agree on the 
national emission caps allocating the allowances to their industrial emitters (Rebennack et al., 
2009). Compared with the carbon taxation method which has a fixed price, the ETS permits 
are traded by the market participants and the cost of emissions is determined by market forces 
(Villoria-Sáez et al., 2016). In the carbon trading system, cap and trade system is commonly 
used approach where each entity is placed a cap of CO2 emissions and receives an allowance 
that is equal to its individual cap value (Chaabane et al., 2012). These entities can sell or buy 
the allowances if they have lower or higher CO2 emissions than the cap values on a yearly 
base. From the cost-effective aspect, the carbon trading system encourages these entities to 
reduce CO2 emissions by investing in more effective technology or utilising renewable 
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energy (Üçtuğ et al., 2014). These entities often have two options: installing their own CCS 
system and buying carbon credits for the excess emissions above the allowance. As a result of 
carbon trading scheme, the cash flows of power plants become dependent on the emission 
amount during operation and the price of carbon trading (Koo et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, the CCS installation depends on both internal and external conditions: its own 
performance effectiveness, economics, emission reduction target and unit price of emission 
allowance. The carbon trading price can be determined by the supply and demand of the 
allowances as any commodity market (Li et al., 2015). Allowance allocation is one of the 
most important policy design issues in emission trading, since the initial allocation of permits 
affects both fairness and market efficiency. Three major methods are available for allowance 
allocation: auction, criteria exogenous to the firm receiving the permits and output-based 
allocation (Liu et al., 2012). In this work, the allowance allocation problem is not considered, 
while the allowances are assumed to be provided in advance.  
‘Fairness’ is not commonly defined and Mathies and Gudergan (2011) suggest the definition 
of fairness as the reasonable, acceptable or just judgment of an outcome which the process 
used to arrive. The fair solution suggests that all game participants can receive an acceptable 
or ‘fair’ portion of benefits. Equality, equity and exemption are considered as different but 
complementary notions of distributive fairness for burden sharing in international climate 
policy (Ringius et al., 2002). Equality means all players should have equal obligations. 
Equity means the costs is distributed proportionally. Exemption means the poorest countries 
just provide moral support instead of material contributions. Responsibilities, capabilities and 
needs are frequently invoked as interpretations of equity for climate change negotiation 
(Underdal and Wei, 2015). Five equity criterial are used to locate carbon emission reduction 
target to model economic performance of interprovincial CO2 emission reduction quota 
trading in China, which are CO2 emissions, energy consumption, population, GDP and per 
capita GDP (Zhou et al., 2013). Different marginal abatement cost curves across different 
provinces are constructed and applied in their work. Game theory has been applied to find the 
‘fair’ solution, where the fair solution suggests that all game participants can receive an 
acceptable or ‘fair’ portion of benefits. A cooperative game is proposed by Rosenhal (2008) 
to determine the transfer prices for the intermediate products in the supply chain to allocate 
the net profit in a fair manner. Nash bargaining framework from cooperative Game theory 
has been applied for ‘fair’ solution in different areas, such as resources allocation problems 
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and fair profit sharing among enterprises (Ganji et al., 2007; Gjerdrum et al., 2001; Gjerdrum 
et al., 2002; Yaiche et al., 2000).  
Qatar is currently the highest emitter per capita, 79.3 tons per capita (Dargin, 2010), and is 
concerned with taking responsibility in carbon emission reduction. Fig. 1 presents the GHG 
emissions by subsector for Qatar in 2012 (Qatar Energy & Industry Sector, 2012), where 
emission from power and utilities represents 12%. Qatar became the first Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) member to join the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) 
project which targets emission reduction by exercising tight controls on gas flaring. CCS is 
considered as a solution among others since it will allow Qatar to continue using the cost 
effective energy sources, fossil fuel, while reducing carbon emissions to the atmosphere. 
Although there are high emission rates in the Gulf states, the carbon trading are stated as 
enormous and would cut down the CO2 emissions while generation revenue for renewable 
energy projects (Qatar Energy & Industry Sector, 2012).  
 
Fig. 1. GHG emission by subsector in 2012 (Qatar Energy & Industry Sector, 2012) 
There are some recent works addressing the design of CCS infrastructure with carbon trading 
effects. Kuby et al. (2011) propose an MILP model to optimise a CCS infrastructure network 
while considering pricing CO2 emissions through a tax or a cap-and-trade system. Johnson 
and Ogden (2011) examine the CCS infrastructure development under the cap-and-trade 
programme with specific bonus. And the proposed optimisation model analyses if the 
LNG/NG 51%
Power & Utilities 12%
Petrochemicals 11%
Mining, Minerals and Others 9%
Oil and Gas (E&P) 8%
Refining 8%
Transport, Storage and
Distribution 0.4%
Support Services 0.03%
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projected allowance prices will support the CCS deployment without the bonuses. CO2 
allowances are considered in a CO2 value chain optimisation work for the Norwegian 
continental shelf (Klokk et al., 2010). Mo et al. (2015) develop a multistage decision model 
to analyse the time of introducing emission trading system, especially the effects on power 
plant CCS retrofit decisions, plant CO2 emissions and net present value (NPV). Carbon 
trading scheme is also addressed in the studies of supply chain optimisation (Chaabane et al., 
2012; Giarola et al., 2012; Zakeri et al., 2015). However, only one site or the total cost is 
minimised rather than considering the individual cost of each member within the carbon 
trading network. By applying carbon trading among power plants, the power plants can be 
taken as collaborative networks. All the power plants have their own objectives and 
constraints which make them compete with other power plants, but they will obtain better 
benefits via cooperation. In this work, we design a comprehensive integrated CCS 
infrastructure under carbon trading, which selects the CO2 resources (power plants) to be 
captured with available capture technologies and materials, and designs the transportation 
pipeline network to connect the resources with the sequestration and/or utilisation sites based 
on the work of Hasan et al. (2014). The proposed MILP model decides whether it is 
beneficial for the CO2 resources to be involved into a CCS system or buy CO2 credits from 
other entities. Fair design of CCS infrastructure for power plants in Qatar is determined by 
determining the carbon trading price and the annual transferred amount among power plants 
under two fairness scenarios: same saving ratio and game theoretical Nash approach 
(Gjerdrum et al., 2001).  
2 Mathematical model 
In this work, a mathematical MILP optimisation model is developed for the fair design of 
integrated carbon capture, transport and storage infrastructure in Qatar under carbon trading 
scheme. It determines the emission capture locations and the capture amount of each power 
plant with CCS. CO2 transportation pipeline network is obtained between various sources and 
sinks based on their distances and geographic situations. The locations of the sinks are 
selected as well as the amount of injection at each reservoir. The carbon credit trading prices 
and the transferred amounts are determined to obtain fair cost distribution among power 
plants. 
The overall optimisation problem can be stated as follows: 
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Given (a) for each source (power plant): its location, annual CO2 emissions without CCS, 
emission rate based on power output, CO2 compositions in the flue gas, power generation 
capacity; (b) capture and compression technologies, corresponding materials and costs; (c) 
CO2 pipeline cost based on distance; (d) for each sink (utilisation or sequestration): its type, 
location, annual CO2 storage estimation, storage limit and injection costs; (e) CO2 selling 
price to the utilisation; (f) available carbon credit trading prices among power plants; (g) 
carbon credit price from abroad; 
Determine (a) CO2 capture amount of each source; (b) CO2 capture technology and its 
corresponding material; (c) sinks to be selected; (d) CO2 storage amount in each sink; (e) 
pipeline network connecting source and sink; (f) carbon credits amount to sell/buy for carbon 
trading among power plants; (g) carbon credit trading prices among power plants; (h) carbon 
credits amount to sell/buy from abroad; 
In order to find the multi-participant strategies which result in optimal, fair cost distribution 
among power plants within the CCS system. 
The notation used in the MILP model is given below: 
Indices  
i  
 
source, power plant 
j  
 
CO2 capture level 
k  carbon trading price levels available between sources 
m  
 
capture material 
s , 's  
 
sink, site for geological storage or utilisation 
t  
 
capture technology 
Sets  
iTM  
 
sets of CO2 capture technology t with capture material m that can be used in 
source i  
Parameters 
min
totalC  
 
minimum total cost ($) 
max
totalC  maximum total cost ($) 
max
iC  maximum cost limit of source i ($) 
T
iC
min  cost of source i from minimising the total cost ($) 
iqC  cost of source i at each separable piece q ($) 
iE  CO2 emission allowance cap value for source i (ton/year) 
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ijM  CO2 mass flow rate for source i at capture level j (ton/year) 
N  big number 
buyp  
 
CO2 credit buying price ($/ton) 
sellp  CO2 credit selling price ($/ton) 
nutilisatiop  CO2 utilisation price ($/ton) 
iP  power generation of source i (MWh) 
max
iP  maximum power generation of source i (MWh) 
U
iiT '  upper bound of carbon trading from source i to source i’ (ton/year) 
i  power consumption rate of CCS for source i 
i  CO2 emission rate of source i (ton CO2/MWh) 
Variables  
iB  
 
bought carbon credits from abroad of each power plant i (ton/year) 
iC  total cost of each power plant i ($/year) 
iCC  carbon capture and compression cost of each power plant i ($/year) 
iCT  carbon trading cost of each power plant i ($/year) 
iDC  dehydration cost of each power plant i ($/year) 
iE  CO2 direct emissions from source i (ton/year) 
iLC  levelised pipeline cost of each power plant i ($/year) 
iLJ  levelised injection cost of each power plant i ($/year) 
ir  
 
carbon trading price of source i ($/ton) 
kr  carbon trading price at level k ($/ton) 
RE  revenue from CO2 utilisation ($/year) 
iS  
 
sold carbon credits to abroad of each power plant i (ton/year) 
'iiT  carbon trading amount from source from source i to source i’ (ton/year) 
kiiT '  linearised carbon trading amount from source from source i to source i’ at k 
price level (ton/year) 
TC  total cost ($/year) 
i  the cost difference between the target cost and optimal cost of source i ($) 
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  objective value 
sq  these are SOS2 special ordered variables (Brooke et al., 2008), where at most 
two variables can take on non-zero values and the two non-zero values have 
to be adjacent.  
Binary variables 
iH  
 
1 if source i buy carbon credits from other sources or abroad, 0 otherwise. 
ijtmsY  1 if source i at capture level j capture CO2 with technology t and material m 
is linked to sink s, 0 otherwise. 
ikZ  1 if source i with transfer price level k is selected, 0 otherwise. 
2.1 CO2 balances 
The CO2 emission balance for each power plant is given in Eq.(1), where the total emissions 
minus the carbon allowance, which is the amount the power plant needs to pay for, equals to 
the amount captured by the CCS system, carbon credit bought from abroad and other 
domestic power plants, minus the carbon credit sold abroad and to other domestic power 
plants. However, for each power plant, it is not allowed to sell carbon credits to other power 
plant before it reaches its own allowance level. Also carbon credits cannot be bought from 
other sites and sold to abroad at the same time. The binary variable iH  is introduced to 
ensure that the above two conditions are satisfied by using the two constraints in Eq.(2) and 
(3). 
iTTSBYMEE
i
ii
i
iiiiijtms
siTMmtj
ijii  
 '
'
'
'
,),(,
 (1) 
iNHTB
i
i
iii

'
'
 (2) 
iHNTS
i
i
iii
 )1(
'
'
 (3) 
2.2 Carbon trading 
The carbon trading price is calculated based on the price selection among the available 
carbon trading price:  
iZrr ik
k
ki   (4) 
For each sink, no more than one transfer price level can be chosen: 
iZ
k
ik  1  (5) 
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The amount of carbon trading is the sum of amounts traded at each carbon trading price level 
k:  
','' iiTT
k
kiiii   (6) 
The upper bound for the amount of carbon trading transferred between sources is introduced, 
which limits the transferred amount from each carbon trading level.  
iZTT ik
U
i
kii 
'
'  (7) 
Hence, the total carbon trading cost for each source is:  
irTrTCT
ki
kkii
ki
iikii  
,'
'
,'
'
 (8) 
2.3 Total cost of each power plant 
The cost of each power plant is calculated in Eq.(9), it equals to the overall cost of the carbon 
capture and storage system, which includes the total system cost, including the dehydration 
cost, carbon capture cost, CO2 transportation cost, CO2 injection cost, and international and 
domestic carbon trading cost, minus the overall system revenue, which is the international 
and domestic carbon trading revenue and CO2 utilisation revenue. The detail calculation of 
each cost term is given in Appendix A based on the CCUS model proposed in (Hasan et al., 
2014). 
iREpCTSpBpLJLCCCDCC i
nutilisatio
ii
sell
i
buy
iiiii   (9) 
The total cost of all the power plants is calculated as below: 

i
iCTC  (10) 
2.4 Power generation constraints 
The CCS technologies are quite energy intensive, e.g. the process of chemical absorption 
with different solvents needs heat in the reboiler to heat up the solvent, provide heat for 
desorption and produce steam to strip CO2 from the solvent. Current post combustion capture 
technology will reduce the electricity output from power plants by about 20% (Lucquiaud 
and Gibbins, 2011; Peeters et al., 2007). So when CCS is installed and operated, the total 
power generation rate would increase to cover the original power output, while the total 
power generation rate (including the energy consumption for the CCS) should be limited by 
the power plant designed capacity as: 
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iPYRPP iijtms
siTMmtj
ijiii  

max
,),(,
  (11) 
Because of the energy consumption for CCS, more CO2 has been emitted based on the total 
power generation amount: 
iYRPPE ijtms
siTMmtj
ijiiiii  

)(ˆ
,),(,
  (12) 
2.5 Objective functions 
If only the total cost TC is minimised in Eq.(13) subject to the constraints in Eqs.(1)-(12) and 
Eqs.(A.1)-(A.12), the cost distribution iC  may not be distributed fairly and there is 
possibility that some power plant would sacrifice their own benefits to obtain the mutual 
benefits. 
TCmin  (13) 
s.t. iCC ii 
max
 
However, each single sink yields their own minimum costs and they will bargain for their 
own benefits, which requires an approach that produces a fair cost distribution subject to 
similar overall performance. In this work, fair cost distribution is obtained under two fairness 
scenarios: cost distribution with the same saving ratio and under game theory Nash approach. 
Under the same saving ratio, the objective of the problem is to obtain the cost of each power 
plant close to the fixed target cost. The target cost of each power plant is determined by the 
ratio of cost savings compared with the current cost value maxiC , which is obtained when no 
CCS system is available and all power plants bought carbon credits from the international 
market. maxtotalC  is the sum of 
max
iC and 
min
totalC  is obtained by minimising the total cost of the 
whole system while the CCS and carbon trading is allowed. In this way, the cost savings from 
utilising CCS and carbon trading is distributed with the same saving percentage.  
iCCCC totaltotaliii 
maxminmax //  (14) 
iCCCC iitotaltotali 
maxmaxmin //  (15) 

i
i1min  (16) 
The mathematical program in Eq.(16) should be solved subject to the constraints in Eqs.(1)-
(12), (14), (15) and Eqs. (A.1)-(A.12). 
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Under game theory Nash approach, the objective is to maximise the product of the deviations 
of the given maximum cost of each sink. Each sink yields minimum cost while trying to 
maximise the objective value in Eq.(17). 
)(max max2 ii
i
CC   (17) 
Using the separable programming approach, the objective function is converted to: 



i
m
q
iqiq
1
2
ˆmax   (18) 
where 22 ln
ˆ    and sq  are parameters given by )ln(
max
iqisq CC  , sqC  are taken 
according to the upper bounds maxiC  and 0.  
iREpCTSpBpLJLCCCDCC iiiiiiiiiq
m
q
iq 

321
1
  (19) 
i
i
m
q
iq 

1
1
  (20) 
qiiq ,0   (21) 
The mathematical program in Eq.(18) through (21) should be solved subject to the constraints 
in Eqs.(1)-(12) and Eqs.(A.1)-(A.12), Eq.(18) being the linear approximation to Eq.(17).  
3 Power plants in Qatar 
Qatar currently has 29 power plants, including 15 power plants consuming natural gas, 3 
consuming oil and 1 using solar radiation (Enipedia, 2015). In this work, 18 power plants are 
considered and their information is given in Appendix B. The maxiP  values are obtained there 
by considering the operation hours as 8000 hours per year. It assumes that there are 9 
sequestration sites (S1 –S9), which are marked in Fig. 2 along with the 18 power plants. S1-
S6 are onshore while S7-S9 are offshore. The proposed model has been implemented for a 
CCS integrated infrastructure with 18 power plants in Qatar under the following major 
assumptions: 
 There are 9 locations available for CO2 sequestration, which avoid the agriculture 
areas and are selected based on population density in Qatar. 
 CO2 composition of flue gas from each power plant is among 4-10% (Hasan et al., 
2014). 
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 The pipeline costs for offshore sinks are 1.5 times of those for the offshore sinks. 
 There are no limits for buying carbon credits from abroad for Qatar. 
 No carbon credits can be sold to other country. 
 Carbon credits can be traded between power plants. 
Different carbon capture technologies, including pressure sing adsorption (PSA), vacuum 
swing adsorption (VSA) and membrane, have their suitable materials. Some alternative 
materials are given in Table 1, such as monoethanolamine (MEA) and piperazine (PZ), while 
13X, AHT, MVY and WEI are known as zeolites. For each combination, it deals with CO2 
capture of feed CO2 composition within specific range. It also results in different investment 
and operating costs.  
 
Fig. 2. Power plants and sequestration/utilisation sinks in Qatar (Enipedia, 2015) 
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Table 1 Carbon capture technology and material (Hasan et al., 2014) 
Process Material CO2 composition 
Absorption MEA 0.01-0.7 
PZ 0.01-0.7 
13X 0.1-0.7 
PSA AHT 0.05-0.7 
MVY 0.05-0.7 
WEI 0.05-0.7 
VSA 13X 0.1-0.7 
AHT 0.1-0.7 
MVY 0.1-0.7 
WEI 0.1-0.7 
Membrane FSC PVAm 0.3-0.7 
POE-2 0.3-0.7 
POE-1 0.3-0.7 
4 Computational results for the indicative example 
In this work, different optimal CCS infrastructures are obtained by minimising total cost 
under four scenarios: 
Scenario 1: No domestic carbon trading among power plants 
Scenario 2: Domestic carbon trading is allowed but without fairness concern 
Scenario 3: Fair cost distribution under the same saving ratio 
Scenario 4: Fair cost distribution under Nash approach 
4.1 CO2 capture with different CO2 caps 
CO2 emission allowance cap values are assumed as 30%, 50% and 70% of the annual 
emissions of each power plant. Carbon capture amount depends on the CO2 credit price, the 
total cost of the CCS system is minimised by considering CO2 credit price ranging from 1 to 
100 $/ton CO2. Fig. 3 (A) presents the total optimal costs of the CCS infrastructure for the 18 
power plants in Qatar under different CO2 credit prices together with the total costs without 
CCS infrastructure. Total captured CO2 amount is given in (B). As indicated in the two 
figures, no CO2 is captured until the CO2 credit price is over $ 69/ton. The increase of credit 
price promotes the CO2 capture which will save money from buying CO2 credits from 
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abroad. The total amount of CO2 to be captured is affected by the carbon emission allowance 
cap values as shown in (B). (C) presents the total CO2 credits bought from abroad for the 18 
power plants, the lower the CO2 emission allowance cap values the more amount of CO2 
credits needs to be bought when the carbon credit price is lower than 69 $/ton. (D) indicates 
the total carbon credits that can be traded within domestic carbon market under the three 
emission allowance cap values.  
A                                                                                B 
 
C                                                                                D 
 
Fig. 3. (A) total cost; (B) total captured CO2; (C) total imported CO2 credits and (D) total 
tradable CO2 credits for the CCS system  
In order to evaluate the fair design of the CCS system in Qatar under CCS and carbon 
trading, the imported carbon credits is taken as 80 $/ton, but all the power plants are not 
allowed to sell carbon credits abroad. There are 8 available carbon trading price levels, from 
45-80 $/ton with even intervals. 
The values of maxiC  are given in Table 2, which are obtained by minimising the total cost of 
the whole system without CCS infrastructure and domestic carbon trading, maxtotalC  is 163.76 
M$/year. mintotalC  is obtained by minimising the total cost of the whole system with CCS system 
and domestic carbon trading within Qatar. In this work, CO2 emission allowance cap values 
are assumed as 70% of the annual emissions of each power plant. The total annual emissions 
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of all the power plants are 6.84 Mt/year, so the total CO2 needs to be captured or traded from 
abroad would be over 2.05 Mt/year because of the extra emissions from utilising CCS. 
Table 2 Cost of each power plant under different scenarios 
Power plant max
iC  
(M$/year) 
Scenario 1 
(M$/year) 
Scenario 2 
(M$/year) 
Scenario 3 
(M$/year) 
Scenario 4 
(M$/year) 
1 30.65 30.65 29.29 27.28 27.64 
2 37.19 35.15 31.25 34.35 37.15 
3 20.67 20.67 18.09 18.34 19.19 
4 18.97 18.97 16.60 16.79 17.62 
5 8.77 8.77 7.68 7.76 7.52 
6 8.64 8.63 7.56 7.67 7.26 
7 8.58 8.58 7.61 7.60 6.94 
8 6.86 6.86 6.00 6.07 5.39 
9 4.95 4.95 4.66 4.38 3.71 
10 4.64 4.64 4.06 4.11 3.48 
11 3.95 3.95 3.45 3.49 2.96 
12 3.67 3.67 3.21 3.24 2.75 
13 2.01 2.01 1.78 1.77 1.50 
14 1.84 1.84 1.61 1.63 1.38 
15 1.25 1.25 1.10 1.11 0.94 
16 0.60 0.60 0.53 0.53 0.45 
17 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.29 
18 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 
Total 163.76 161.70 144.94 146.60 146.28 
4.2 CCS infrastructure under Scenario 1: no domestic carbon trading 
When the total cost is minimised in Eq. (13) subject to the constraints in Eqs.(1)-(12) and 
Eqs.(A.1)-(A.12), while no domestic carbon trading is allowed, the optimal CCS 
infrastructure is shown in Table 3. Power plants 2 and 6 choose to have their own CCS, and 
they transport CO2 to sinks 8 and 6 individually. The source and sink matches are based on 
the distance between source and sink, shorter distance is preferred. The CCS technology and 
material selection is also given in the table, where absorption is selected with MEA as 
material for plant 2, while PSA with MVY is selected for power plant 6. For both power 
plants, 40% of their emissions are captured which are the amounts of CO2 over the assigned 
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carbon trading caps (70%). In total, 0.69 Mt/year CO2 has been captured, which includes the 
30% emissions over the caps and the emissions from CCS utilisation. Furthermore, since the 
CCS capture efficiency is 90%, more emissions needs to be captured to cover the losses. All 
other power plants except these two power plants keep buying carbon credit from the 
international market rather than having their own CCS systems. The cost of each power plant 
is provided in Table 2, and the total cost is 161.70 M$/year which is 2.06 M$/year less than 
the cost maxtotalC , 163.76 M$/year, where no CCS is available as shown in the second column. 
Only the two power plants with CCS reduce their total costs, and all other power plants have 
the same costs as maxiC   
Table 3 CCS integrated infrastructures under different scenarios 
Scenario Power 
plant 
Capture 
level 
Capture 
Technology 
Material Sink Total capture 
amount (Mt/year) 
1 2 0.4 Absorption MEA S8 0.56 
6 0.4 PSA MVY S6 0.13 
2 1 1 Absorption MEA S9 1.15 
2 1 Absorption MEA S8 1.39 
13 1 PSA MVY S8 0.08 
3 2 1 Absorption MEA S8 1.39 
3 1 Absorption MEA S8 0.78 
6 1 PSA WEI S6 0.32 
4 1 0.9 Absorption MEA S9 1.03 
2 0.9 Absorption MEA S8 1.26 
6 1 PSA MVY S6 0.32 
4.3 CCS infrastructure under Scenario 2: with domestic carbon trading but 
no fairness concern 
When the total cost is minimised in Eq. (13) subject to the constraints in Eqs.(1)-(12) and 
Eqs.(A.1)-(A.12), but domestic carbon trading is allowed, the optimal CCS infrastructure is 
shown in Table 3. Power plants 1, 2 and 13 choose to have their own CCS. Sinks 9 and 8 are 
selected for CO2 storage. The three power plants choose to have the capture levels 100%, 
which are higher than the CO2 amounts they need to reduce. In total 2.62 Mt/year are 
captured with absorption and PSA technologies. The cost of each power plant is provided in 
the fourth column of Table 2, and the total cost is 144.94 M$/year which is about 10% less 
than that without domestic carbon trading, 161.70 M$/year. However, as shown in Table 4, 
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the costs are distributed without considering the saving ratios, 
maxmax /)( iii CCC  , which vary 
among all power plants. Fair cost distribution among power plants is required. 
Table 4 Saving ratios 
maxmax /)( iii CCC   under Scenario 2 
Power plant Saving 
ratio 
Power plant Saving ratio Power plant Saving ratio 
1 4% 7 11% 13 11% 
2 16% 8 13% 14 13% 
3 12% 9 6% 15 12% 
4 12% 10 13% 16 12% 
5 12% 11 13% 17 13% 
6 13% 12 13% 18 7% 
4.4 CCS infrastructures under Scenario 3 and 4: with domestic carbon 
trading under fairness concerns 
The developed MILP models for fair cost distribution are implemented using CPLEX 
12.6.3.0 in GAMS 24.7.1 (www.gams.com) (Brooke et al., 2008) on a PC with an Intel(R) 
Core(TM) i7-4770 CPU, 3.40 GHz CPU and 16.0 GB of RAM. Under the same saving ratio 
fairness scenario, there are 2,315 equations, 63,111 continuous variables and 17,082 discrete 
variables and it takes about 156s CPU time. Under the Game theory Nash approach fairness 
scenario, there are 2,315 equations, 63,380 continuous variables and 17,082 discrete variables 
and it takes 54s CPU time. 
Under Scenario 3, by applying the proposed model in Eq.(16) subject to the constraints in 
Eqs.(1)-(12), (14), (15) and Eqs. (A.1)-(A.12), the optimal design of the CCS infrastructure 
with domestic carbon trading at the same saving ratio is obtained as presented in Table 3. 
Power plants 2, 3 and 6 choose to have CCS systems with capture level 100%. Power plant 2 
and 3 select MEA as absorption material and transport the CO2 to sink 8. Power plant 6 
selects PSA and transport the CO2 to sink 6. The total cost of the integrated CCS 
infrastructure is 146.60 M$/year, which is slightly higher than that from Scenario 2 (144.94 
M$/year) and about 9% savings than that without domestic carbon trading under Scenario 1. 
Under the proposed same saving ratio objective, the costs of all the power plants are 
distributed based on the same saving ratio as shown in the fifth column of Table 2. The cost 
of each power plant is close to its corresponding assigned target. The differences between the 
cost and target value of each power plant are presented in Fig. 4. Cost of power plant 2 varies 
with the biggest   value among all power plants. The carbon trading prices between power 
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plants and the annual carbon trading amounts are presented in Fig. 5. Power plants 2 and 3 
sell carbon credits at the carbon trading prices 65 $/ton and 75 $/ton individually, while both 
power plant 6 sells carbon credits at 80 $/ton. Power plant 2 sells 224 kton/year carbon 
credits to power plant 1 and 99 kton/year to power plant 4, which is more than half of its total 
sold carbon credits (620 kton/year). For power plant 3, it mainly sells the carbon credits to 
power plant 4 and 5, and the remaining 143 kton/year carbon credits are shared by seven 
other power plants. Power plants 1 is the only customer of power plant 6. In total 1,108 
kton/year of captured carbon emissions are sold as credits by the four power plants with CCS 
under the domestic carbon trading scheme. Under this scenario, seven power plants in total 
have imported 107 kton/year carbon credits from abroad at the carbon credits price 80 $/ton. 
The carbon credits are mainly imported by power plants 8 and 10.  
 
Fig. 4. i  value of each power plant under Scenario 3 
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Fig. 5. Carbon trading prices between power plants and annual carbon trading amounts under 
Scenario 3 
Under Scenario 4, the fairness is defined by the game theory Nash approach, the 
mathematical program in Eq.(18) through (21) are solved subject to the constraints in 
Eqs.(1)-(12) and Eqs.(A.1)-(A.12). The optimal design of the CCS infrastructure is also given 
in Table 3. Power plants 1, 2 and 6 choose to have their own CCS systems, where both power 
plants 1 and 2 select MEA as absorption material while power plant 6 selects MVY as PSA 
material. The total cost of the integrated CCS infrastructure is 146.28 M$/year. The cost 
distribution of the 18 power plants is presented in the last column in Table 2. Cost of each 
power plant has been reduced from the upper bound values, maxiC  as shown in the table. Fig.6 
shows the carbon trading prices between power plants and the annual carbon trading 
amounts. In total the three power plants sell 1,077 kton/year carbon credits to the other power 
plants which is less than that from scenario 3. These power plants select different carbon 
trading prices, 75, 60 and 75 $/ton respectively. Power plant 2 has more carbon credits to sell 
compared with the other two power plants. Power plants 3 and 4 are the main buyers among 
all the other power plants and about 45% total domestic tradable carbon credits are obtained 
by them. Power plant 7 solely imports the carbon credits from abroad with the amount of 14 
kton/year at the price of 80 $/ton, while all other power plants only buy carbon credits 
domestically. The two fairness scenarios result in different CCS infrastructures with different 
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carbon trading amounts under different carbon trading prices. Fig. 7 presents the two 
infrastructures, for both scenarios some carbon credits have to be imported from abroad and 
power plant 2 and 6 are selected to install CCS and sell carbon credits to other power plants. 
Meanwhile, sink 6 and 8 are the main reservoirs for CO2 storage. 
 
Fig. 6. Carbon trading prices between power plants and annual carbon trading amounts under 
Scenario 4 
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Fig. 7. CCS infrastructures under Scenario 3 and 4 
5. Concluding remarks 
An MILP model has been proposed for the optimal design of integrated carbon capture, 
transport and storage infrastructure in Qatar. Under the carbon trading scheme, power plants 
with higher emission are promoted to invest on the CCS system with higher capture rate and 
the extra carbon credits can be sold to other power plants. In this way, higher CO2 capture 
rate can be obtained domestically rather than buying carbon credits from the international 
market. The power plants with CCS system can benefit from selling carbon credits and on the 
other hand the emissions of the other power plants can be limited within the assigned cap 
with lower expenses. It should be mentioned that the fairness metric used does affect the 
optimal design of the CCS infrastructure among the 18 power plants. In this work, two 
alternative fairness metrics have been investigated: same saving ratio and game theory Nash 
approach. Under scenarios 3 and 4, the total costs are slightly higher than that from 
minimising the total cost to obtain the fair cost distribution. The cost distributions among the 
power plants under the two fairness scenarios vary resulting from the selected CCS systems, 
carbon trading prices and transfer amounts between power plants. Three power plants 
determine to install CCS systems, while other power plants buy the carbon credits from those 
power plants or abroad to fulfil their carbon allowance requirements. Meanwhile, power 
plants with CCS systems obtain economic benefits by selling the credits. 
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The future work includes pipeline network investigation, such as the location of pumps and 
connection of pipelines of different sizes. Other emitters, including refineries and chemical 
factories, can be added as sinks to CCS infrastructure under the carbon trading scheme. 
Power generation distribution among power plants can also be considered since they have 
different carbon emission rates. Moreover, optimal CCS design under multi-period will be 
modelled based on minimising the total cost while considering the operating lives of sources 
and sinks at different time periods. The installation and operation of the components within 
the CCS infrastructure will be determined. Environmental issue can also be included to the 
optimal design of the integrated CCS infrastructure.  
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Appendix A: CCUS supply chain model based on the work of Hasan et 
al. (Hasan et al., 2014) 
The additional notations are given as: 
Sets: 
U  sets of utilisation sink 
Parameters: 
baseC  base cost for CO2 pipeline capital cost calculation ($/km) 
CCR  capital charge rate per year of total ownership of cost  
sd  the well depth of sink s (km) 
iF  total flue gas flow rate from source i (mol/s) 
ijtmIC  investment cost of source i, with capture level j, using capture technology t with 
material m ($/year) 
baseL  base length for CO2 pipeline calculation (km) 
isL  direct distance between source i and sink s (km) 
minsource
iM  minimum CO2 capture capacity for source i (ton/year) 
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baseM  CO2 base flow for pipeline capital cost calculation (ton/year) 
maxsin k
sM  maximum designed capacity for sink s (ton/year) 
maxwellM  maximum injection capacity of a well (ton/year) 
1m , 2m  cost parameter for well construction and injection 
tmn  capture and compression investment cost factor for technology t material m 
tmn'  capture and compression operation cost factor for technology t material m 
injection
ijn  the number of wells required for injecting CO2 from source i at capture level j 
ijtmOC   operation cost of source i, with capture level j, using capture technology t with 
material m ($/year) 
piplingOM  operation and maintenance cost rate per year of TOC for pipelines ($/year) 
DP  dehydration cost per ton of CO2 ($/ton) 
tmq  capture and compression investment cost factor for technology t material m 
tmq'  capture and compression operation cost factor for technology t material m 
ijR  source i CO2 capture level j 
ix  flue gas CO2 composition from source i 
qn,,,,   model parameters for different capture technologies with different materials, 
which are estimated using the maximum likelihood parameter estimation for the best fit. 
  CO2 flow rate scaling factor 
CCS  CO2 capture efficiency 
  distance scaling factor 
A.1 Cost of flue gas dehydration 
All saturated flue gases from stationary sources are assumed to be dehydrated using the TEG-
absorption. Extra cost included in the CO2 capture and compression cost based on the flue 
gas. The cost is computed based on a saturated flue gas from a power plant. 
iPYMDC CCSDijtmsij
siTMmtj
i  

/
,),(,
 (A.1) 
A.2 Cost of CO2 capture and compression 
The optimum investment and operation costs for different capture technologies can be 
calculated based on the flue gas CO2 composition and respective technology, including 
absorption, membrane, PSA and VSA processes. CO2 is captured from the dehydrated feed 
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and compressed for sequestration at 150 bar. The investment cost (IC) and operating cost 
(OC) can be calculated as: 
i
tmq
ijitm
tmn
itmtmijtm TMmtijRFxIC  ),(,,))((   (A.2) 
i
tmq
ijitm
tmn
itmtmijtm TMmtijRFxOC  ),(,,))(''('
''   (A.3) 
The total cost for CO2 capture and compression is: 
iYOCICCC ijtmsijtmijtm
siTMmtj
i  

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,),(,
 (A.4) 
The conversion from flue gas flow rate to CO2 mass flow rate is given below: 
jixRFM CCSiijiij ,
10
365*24*3600*44
*
6
   (A.5) 
A.3 Cost of CO2 transportation 
The total levelised piping cost is calculated based on the distance between the sources and 
sinks as: 
iY
L
L
L
M
M
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A.4 Cost of CO2 injection 
The cost of CO2 injection for sequestration includes the levelised costs of CO2 injection and 
construction of new walls. 
iYnmdmOMCCRLJ ijtms
injection
ijs
injection
siTMmtj
i  

))(( 21
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 (A.7) 
The number of wells required for injecting CO2 from source i at level j as: 
ji
M
M
n
well
ijinjection
ij ,max 
 (A.8) 
A.5 Revenue from CO2 utilisation 
The revenue from CO2 utilisation comes from selling high purity CO2 to the prospective CO2 
utilisation sites. 
iPYMRE nutilisatioijtmsij
UsiTMmtj
i  
 ,),(,
 (A.9) 
A.6 Related constraints 
For each source, at most one technology with one material can be selected over different CO2 
recovery levels and it can only be transferred to no more than one sink. 
iY
siTMmtj
ijtms 

1
,),(,
 (A.10) 
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The total amount of CO2 stored in each sink needs to be limited within its designed capacity. 
sMYM ks
iTMmtij
ijtmsij 

maxsin
),(,,
 (A.11) 
For each source, the captured amount of CO2 should be over the minimum capture unit 
capacity: 
iYMYM
iTMmtj
ijtms
source
i
iTMmtj
ijtmsij  
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min
),(,
 (A.12) 
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Appendix B: Power plants in Qatar (Enipedia, 2015) 
 Power plant Capacity (MW) Fuel_types Output (MWh) CO2 (Mt) Maximum  
output (MWh) 
Carbon emission 
 rate (kg CO2/MWh) 
Lat Lon Xco2 (%) 
1 "Ras Laffan-a Powerplant" 756 Natural Gas 3711940 1.28 6048000 344.83 25.92 51.55 6 
2 "Ras Abu Fontas B1 Powerplant" 985 Natural Gas 3490870 1.55 7880000 444.02 25.20 51.62 5.6 
3 "Ras Abu Fontas A Powerplant" 626 Natural Gas 1850900 0.86 5008000 464.64 25.21 51.62 5.2 
4 "Ras Laffan-b Powerplant" 1025 Natural Gas 1688810 0.79 8200000 467.79 25.92 51.55 4.8 
5 "Umm Said Refinery Powerplant" 128 Natural Gas 734945 0.37 1024000 503.44 24.92 51.56 4.4 
6 "Al-wajbah Powerplant" 301 Natural Gas, Oil 723120 0.36 2408000 497.84 25.30 51.40 8 
7 "Ras Laffan Rasgas Powerplant" 330 Natural Gas 718016 0.36 2640000 501.38 25.89 51.54 4 
8 "Qafco Works Powerplant" - - 563471 0.29 676165 514.67 24.99 51.55 4 
9 "Ras Laffan Qatargas Powerplant" 187 Natural Gas 396416 0.21 1496000 529.75 25.91 51.56 4 
10 "Ras Abu Aboud Powerplant" - - 369993 0.19 443992 513.52 25.32 51.51 4 
11 "Saliyah Powerplant" 134 Natural Gas, Oil 310524 0.16 1072000 515.26 25.21 51.39 4 
12 "Mesaieed Qvc Powerplant" - - 286768 0.15 344122 523.07 24.99 51.55 4 
13 "Doha South Super Powerplant" 67 Natural Gas, Oil 149590 0.08 536000 534.80 25.19 51.52 10 
14 "Umm Said Qapco Powerplant" - - 136098 0.08 163318 587.81 25.00 51.55 4 
15 "Dukhan Field Powerplant" 44 Natural Gas 90051 0.05 352000 555.24 25.42 50.75 4 
16 "Maersk Qatar Powerplant" - - 40943 0.03 49132 732.73 25.35 51.18 4 
17 "Halul Terminal Powerplant" - - 25319 0.02 30383 789.92 25.67 52.42 4 
18 "Abu-samra Powerplant" - - 10503 0.01 12604 952.11 25.22 50.97 4 
 
 
 
